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segregation gradually disappear. The Negroes may be the mid-twentieth cen-
tury version of the German, Scandinavian, Irish, Bohemian, Polish and Italian
minorities that came before them. If this is so, the future of segregated housing
in Northern urban centers is dependent on all the factors, such as occupation,
income and education, that condition the social status of Negroes. And the
location and segregated nature of public housing may in many places be de-
pendent on these same factors.
QUINTIN JOHNSTONEt
MONOPOLY IN AMERICA. By Walter Adams and Horace M. Gray. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1955. Pp. xv, 221. $3.50.
"THE Government as Promoter," the subtitle of this, little volume, supplies
the key to the authors' thesis that government today "frequently puts together
the very power concentrates which the antitrust authorities are later called
upon to break asunder."' This thesis is tested in five fields of governmental
activity: public utilities regulation, tax policies, defense procurement, surplus
property disposal and atomic energy. In each area the authors find that gov-
ernmental power has been used to promote rather than to dissipate monopolies.2
Messrs. Adams and Gray quote Scripture in support of the position that
"among all the devices used by government to promote monopoly, public
utility . . . regulation is in some respects perhaps the worst."3 They recom-
mend a gradual transition toward unbridled competition in trucking, shipping
and air transport, suggesting that governmental activity in these fields should
be confined to maintaining safety and to enforcing the antitrust laws so as to
maintain a maximum degree of competition. 4 And they urge a drastic reversal
of the federal policy that promotes monopoly in television, notwithstanding the
limitations of technology.
In dealing with tax policies,6 the authors inveigh against depletion deduc-
tions because they "accrue primarily to large integrated manufacturing firms," 7
and accelerated amortization because it is "a boon to a relatively few large
corporations." s They also criticize the tax incentives to financing by retention
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of corporate profits because they promote industrial concentration. 9 Finally,
they favor use of the power to tax and spend as "a powerful tool" to make
our economy more competitive 10 without, unfortunately, telling us precisely
how and where this is to be done.
The discussion of defense procurement 11 lays great stress on the General
Motors tank contract, berating the Department of Defense for concentrating
the manufacture of medium tanks in one company. There may have been
sound arguments against awarding the tank contract to General Motors. But
it is open to serious question whether the award of the contract to Chrysler
rather than General Motors would have promoted competition. Dixon-Yates
also comes in for lambasting in this chapter. Here also, it is not easy to see
the antitrust consequences of the decision to make or abrogate this contract,
whatever may be said of the other policy reasons for disapproving the deal.
The authors make their strongest case in their discussion of the federal
government's disposal of surplus property.' 2 They roundly condemn the sale
of the Geneva facilities to United States Steel, and likewise the government's
policies in disposing of the synthetic rubber facilities. But the authors do
commend the disposal policies in aluminum, and allow that the aggressive
efforts of the surplus property disposal agencies "considerably weakened"
Alcoa's market power.' 3
The chapter on atomic energy 14 is highly critical of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954.15 It is predicted that the Act will have the effect of throttling com-
petition and restricting opportunity because the law neither promotes nor pro-
tects competition in an industry which by its nature is hard to enter. 16
In the opening and concluding chapters Messrs. Adams and Gray philoso-
phize on the "ambivalent" attitude of Americans towards private concentration
of economic power, which they feel underlies the ambivalent role of the gov-
ernment.17 They assert, without citation of authority, that since 1940 there has
been a "retreat from the traditional antimonopoly policy which for over three
hundred years has prevailed in the Anglo-Saxon community."' 8 Surely they
are misinformed if they believe that there has been any long-prevailing policy
9. P. 95. The authors do not mention Subchapter C of Chapter 1 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 on Corporate Reorganizations. By authorizing tax free exchanges
of capital stock in certain circumstances, these provisions have encouraged many smaller
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in England opposed to private concentration of economic power.1 In this
country there has been conflict and confusion concerning anti-monopoly policy
but no recent "retreat" has been discernible from the vantage point of this
reviewer.
Contrary to the authors' suggestion, the ambivalence and confusion in our
policies is not something new; it appears to have existed for generations. 20
Moreover, it has been reflected in the attitude of the judiciary in interpretations
of the law against monopolization as well as in the policies of the two other
co-ordinate branches of our federal government. While interpretations of the
Sherman Act changed significantly in the quarter century between the opinion
of the Supreme Court in the United States Steel case 2' and that in the second
American Tobacco case, 22 even absolute power over the market has yet to be
condemned per se under our "charter of freedom." Intent-that will-o'-the-wisp
in the law-continues to dominate the definition of monopolization. Market
power to exclude is not yet the sole ingredient of monopolization; there must
be, in addition, proof of an "intent," "purpose" or "desire" to use that power.2 3
As a consequence, a putative monopolist having absolute power to exclude
may still escape condemnation under the law on the ground that he has not
been shown to have manifested any desire to exercise the power. Thus, the
judicial definition of monopolization contains the same ambivalence towards
concentration of economic power that is found in the attitude of the two other
branches of our government and in that of the general public.
Messrs. Adams and Gray have neatly highlighted the conflict in policy in
governmental activities, and the consequent encouragement to private economic
concentration in this country. But they have not made a careful, detailed study
of the facts upon which to build a program for that reform which they so
ardently seek. There is a real need for a study that would delineate precisely
the areas in which, and the extent to which, our governmental policies promote
economic concentration. Until such an analysis is made there can be no in-
telligent reorientation of policy.24
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